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The introduction of penicillin in clinical practice dates back to the 1940s, and almost
immediately the possibility for micro-organisms to develop resistance to antibiotics was
recognised. Some 60 years later, antimicrobial resistance has become a major public
health concern and a world-wide problem, requiring international approaches. The
world’s leading health authorities, such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), as well as the European Community
have recognised the importance to study the emergence and determinants of
antimicrobial resistance and launched strategies for its control (1-3).
Antimicrobial resistance makes infections more difficult to treat. It may also increase the
length and severity of illness, the period of infectiousness, adverse reactions (due to the
need to use less safe alternative drugs), length of hospital admission – and costs (4, 5).
The emergence of resistance represents adaptive selection by micro-organisms which is
to some extent an inevitable result of the therapeutic use of antibiotics. Killing or
suppressing drug-sensitive organisms allows naturally drug-resistant ones to emerge
which can then not only spread but also transfer their resistance to other organisms. 
There is an established but complex relation between the consumption of antibiotics and
the prevalence of drug resistance in micro-organisms. This problem can not be overcome
by continuously developing new drugs, as time needed may come too short. An important
complementary step is to avoid further increase in resistance by reducing unnecessary
and inappropriate use of antibiotics.
This makes it imperative that measures are taken to slow the emergence and spread of
resistance to existing antibiotics and to new ones as they come into use. This chapter
provides a brief discussion on the concept of resistance and will illustrate some clinical
implications of recalcitrant infections with resistant strains as opposed to infections with
susceptible strains.
Mechanisms of resistance
Resistance is considered to be present if a bacterium is not susceptible to a clinically-
relevant concentration of an antibiotic and/or when it is possible to demonstrate that the
bacterium possesses a mechanism or property which will render the antibiotic ineffective.
Resistance of a bacterium to an antibacterial substance may be:
Inherent: the species is not normally susceptible to a particular drug. This may be due to
an inability of the antibacterial to enter the bacterial cell and reach its target site(s), lack
of affinity between the antibacterial drug and its target (site of action), or absence of the
target in the cell. This is also called intrinsic resistance.
Acquired: the species is normally susceptible to a particular drug but certain strains
express drug resistance that may be mediated via a number of mechanisms:
i. destroying enzymatically the antimicrobial agent inside or outside the cell;
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ii. lowering the intracellular concentration of an antimicrobial as a result of reduced
uptake and/or increased excretion;
iii. altering the target site so that the antimicrobial no longer binds to it;
iv. creating an alternative metabolic pathway that bypasses the target action.
In those strains having an inherent or an acquired mechanism of resistance, minimum
inhibitory concentrations (MICs) of the antibiotic may be higher than those which may be
achieved for an adequate period at the site of infection and, hence, there is the risk of
therapeutic failure. Sometimes two or more mechanisms exist simultaneously in the
same organism and may produce an even greater degree of resistance. One single
mechanism of resistance may bring about the ability to resist actions of some or all of the
drugs of a particular class (cross-resistance). Therefore, exposure of a bacterial
population to one single antibiotic may select for organisms that display resistance to a
large number of similar agents.
Transfer of resistance
There is a genetic basis for all bacterial resistance to antimicrobial agents. Inherent
resistance is determined by the genetic composition of a particular bacterial species.
Acquired resistance is brought about either by random mutation of the DNA of the
bacterial genome, which is then passed on to offspring, or by the acquisition of DNA
containing a gene or genes which code for a mechanism(s) of resistance. DNA may be
transmitted to other bacterial cells by three processes: conjugation, transformation and
transduction (6). 
In conjugative transfer, DNA passes along a tube that links two bacteria, which may occur
between bacteria of the same or similar species. Plasmids carrying genes as transposable
elements (transposons) may transfer between cells. Those carrying more than one
transposon can encode resistance to many, chemically unrelated, antibacterials. 
Transformation involves the uptake of DNA from the environment. DNA acquired by this
process may come from an unrelated species, and antibacterial resistance may be
acquired even from species not usually responsible for causing disease.
Transduction involves the transfer of DNA by a bacteriophage.
Extent of the problem
There is no clear answer to the question of the extent of the resistance problem. In the
Netherlands, for example, the ‘Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu’ (RIVM,
National Institute of Public Health and the Environment) and a number of associated
regional laboratories run a resistance monitoring programme. The data can be used in
order to formulate antibiotics policy both inside and outside hospitals. However, this
concentrates on selected material so that no picture is established of morbidity and
mortality in the population as a whole or of financial consequences. 
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Resistant strains are generally no more virulent than non-resistant ones. However, an
infection with a resistant strain can be much more serious because the chance of effective
treatment is much lower. Little is known about the frequency of problems of this kind. In
addition, it is also possible that patients will remain contagious for longer as a result of
inadequate treatment so that an infectious disease can spread more extensively.
Mild infections often improve after treatment using antibiotics to which the pathogen is
resistant (7). The reason for this may be that, despite the reduction in susceptibility,
enough effective concentrations are still attained at the location of the infection (8, 9).
Another possible cause is that the natural course of many of these infections - such as
bronchitis, otitis and sinusitis - is also generally positive without antibiotics (7).
Staphylococcus aureus: resistant (MRSA) or susceptible to methicillin
(MSSA)
In a case-control study, patients infected with MRSA and MSSA in a hospital in the United
States were compared with one another (10). Of the S. aureus infections, 31% were caused
by MRSA. Infection was associated with several prior courses of antibiotics and extension
of the period of admission by seven days. There was no increase in mortality. Another
study produced a comparable result (11). In some hospital departments, the period of
admission was increased by 30 days. 
In a retrospective study Crowcroft and Catchpole used death certificates to examine the
evidence that mortality due to MRSA and staphylococcal infections in England and Wales
is increasing (12). MRSA was mentioned on 20.6% (1387/6723) of death certificates that
included an ICD-9 code for staphylococcal infection, gradually increasing from 7.5% in
1993 to 25.0% in 1998. Although recognising limitations of using routine mortality data
for monitoring the impact of MRSA, they conclude that infections due to MRSA seem to
be an increasing cause of mortality in England and Wales.
It is assumed that there are a number of risk factors for the contraction and selection of
MRSA, like frequent and extensive use of wide-spectrum antibiotics, lengthy hospital
admission, presence of decubitus ulcers and other pre-existent skin disorders,
intravascular endoprotheses, administration systems and indwelling catheters.
Recently a number of reports are published on MRSA strains possessing the Panton
Valentine Leukocidin (PVL) gene. The PVL gene encodes a highly potent toxin, which is
involved in severe skin infections and necrotising pneumonia. PVL positive MRSA strains
have been detected in the Netherlands and have also been reported in France (in healthy
individuals), in the United States (in the Los Angeles gay community, and in a large
prison), and in Scotland (small outbreaks of skin abscesses in healthcare staff) (13). It has
been suggested that the PVL MRSA is acquired in the community (14-16). 
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Penicillin-resistant and penicillin-sensitive Streptococcus pneumoniae
The mechanism for penicillin resistance in pneumococci is comparable to that of MRSA
and is based upon the change in the affinity of beta-lactam antibiotics for the penicillin-
binding proteins in the bacterial cell wall (6). Penicillin resistance in pneumococci is still
only a sporadic phenomenon in the Netherlands (17), but studies in other European
countries report resistance rates of 50% or more (18). The fact that the highest MIC value
found for pneumococci in European research is 8 mg/l whereas this is normally 
< 0.1 mg/l shows that resistance is not absolute. That is why, in the treatment of less
serious infections with high doses of penicillin or amoxicillin, a beneficial effect is still
usually seen. In the case of more complex infections and infections in compartments
where the antibiotic penetrates with greater difficulty, as in the case of the central nervous
system and pulmonary abscesses in emphysema, therapeutic failure should be kept in
mind (8). Penicillin-resistant pneumococci are less susceptible to cephalosporins.
Furthermore, a considerable proportion is resistant to other drugs such as the
macrolides, quinolones and doxycycline. The diffusion of teicoplanin and clindamycin is
poor in cerebrospinal fluid. Susceptibility is universal only in the case of vancomycin.
Complications seen in penicillin resistance have been described in systemic
pneumococcal infections with bacteraemia. In a retrospective study in Spain (19),
mortality was significantly higher (54%, n=24) in patients with infections involving
resistant pneumococci than in patients with susceptible pneumococci (25%, n=48).
Patients with resistant pneumococci had often been treated with antibiotics before. They
had also suffered from pneumonia more often and more of them were seriously ill. In a
later prospective study carried out by the same researchers, no increase in mortality was
found after the results had been corrected for other causes of death (20).
Implications
Resistance is a problem with logistical and economical implications. This is true in particular
of the severe infections that require hospital admission or which arise in hospitals. In the
case of multi-resistance, quarantine measures are required which are not only difficult for
the patient in psychosocial terms but which are also accompanied by a higher workload for
staff. Often, relatively expensive antimicrobial therapies are required. A number of controlled
studies have shown that, in patients with both an infection and resistance, length of
admission and costs in general are at least doubled (8).
For general practitioners, it is of major importance to follow a restrictive antibiotic policy
given the fact that many infections seen in general practice (upper airway infections) are
caused by viruses. Antibiotics should only be prescribed upon strict indication. The
Standards of the Netherlands Society of General Practitioners, partly available in English,
provide guidelines in this respect (21). If an antibiotic is indicated, the classic drugs
should be selected first. Where possible, preference will be for drugs with a narrow
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spectrum. In addition, reserve drugs should never be prescribed blindly, since this can
contribute to the increase of resistance to these drugs. If an antibiotic therapy that has
been started fails, resistance should be tested by means of a culture. Subsequent
treatment should be based on the result of this test.
For a number of bacterial antigens and clinical situations, it has been demonstrated that
resistance to antibiotics is a complicating factor. Resistance constitutes a threat to
patients in risk categories such as those with reduced immunity or those who are infected
with tuberculosis or salmonella bacteria. Fast treatment that covers the susceptibility
spectrum can often save lives here. If the right antibiotic is not prescribed for this patient
group given the susceptibility of the bacterium, therapeutic failure with serious
consequences is seen more often than if the right choice had been made. Alongside
common strains of bacteria such as Staphylococcus aureus and enterococci, it is in the
nature of things that more resistant strains are found in this situation, examples being
Pseudomonas spp. and Serratia spp. For a few of the species, it has been shown that
infections with resistant strains are associated with higher rates of morbidity, mortality
and recurrent infections. This applies to the entire range of Gram-positive and -negative
species of bacteria that can cause bacteraemia. Not a single one of these species of
bacteria is an obligate pathogen; they constitute a part of the indigenous flora or of flora
in the environment that colonises the patient. It is only under exceptional circumstances
that their pathogenic properties become evident.
In the Netherlands, in October 1996, the Dutch Working Party on Antibiotic Policy (Dutch
acronym is SWAB) was established as an initiative of the Society of Infectious Diseases and
the professional societies of medical microbiologists and hospital pharmacists (22). The
mission of the SWAB is to contribute to the containment of the development of
antimicrobial resistance and of the expanding costs of the use of antibiotics. This is
achieved by optimising the use of antibiotics by means of guideline development,
education and antibiotic resistance surveillance. In December 2000, the Council on Health
Research advised the government on antibiotic resistance. The Minister of Health
responded in November 2001, stating that she would follow this advice to a large extent.
This advice by the Council on Health Research as well as the decision made by the Minister
of Health are of great importance to the SWAB, because the SWAB has since then been
designated to co-ordinate the surveillance of antibiotic resistance in the Netherlands.
Background and outline of thesis
Pathogens have never recognised the ever more fading European frontiers as barriers.
There is a clear need for European collaboration to control infectious diseases. The Treaty
of Amsterdam makes provision for action directed towards improving public health,
preventing human illness and diseases. At the EU conference ‘The Microbial Threat’, held
in Copenhagen in 1998, all EU Member States unanimously agreed that antimicrobial
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resistance was no longer a national problem, but a major international issue requiring a
common strategy at European level (23). One of the recommendations made at this
conference was that a European surveillance system of antimicrobial resistance should be
set up. In the same year the RIVM (National Institute of Public Health and the
Environment) in the Netherlands had taken the initiative and received funding from the
European Commission to start with the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance
System (EARSS). In 2001, at a follow-up EU-conference in Visby, Sweden, it was
concluded that all Member States should join EARSS as a minimum requirement of
national surveillance programmes.
Surveillance of antimicrobial resistance is a first step towards containment of the problem
and is generally considered to be necessary to provide local data for selection of empirical
therapy, to assess the scale of the resistance problem at local, national or international
level, to monitor changes in resistance rates, to detect the emergence and spread of new
resistances, and to provide a measure of the effectiveness of interventions aimed at
reducing resistance. Surveillance can also provide an opportunity to improve the quality
of susceptibility testing among participants in the surveillance (24). 
This thesis aims to explore ways how to set up and improve European surveillance of
antimicrobial resistance as a necessary step in the containment of antimicrobial
resistance. Microbiological laboratories are using different diagnostic protocols between
and even within countries. Indications for taking clinical samples may vary as well as the
choice of antibiotics. Criteria for discriminating resistant isolates from susceptible
bacteria are often based on national, and not on international consensus. How to address
these problems, aiming to provide reproducible and comparable data from the
participating laboratories, is studied and discussed in chapters 2 and 3.
In chapter 4 the question is asked whether laboratories in different countries are able to
provide reliable results when it comes to susceptibility testing of the bacterial species
under surveillance. For this reason we initiated an external quality exercise to study the
comparability of susceptibility test results among participants.
In chapter 5 a survey is described to investigate the European geographical distribution
and a trend-analysis of the susceptibility of the community-acquired pathogen S.
pneumoniae against a number of indicator antibiotics.
In chapter 6 we investigate whether there is a relationship between the level of resistance
in a certain country and the level of antimicrobial use. We therefore study the correlation
between S. pneumoniae resistance rates and the amount of penicillin and macrolides used
at country level.
In chapter 7 a survey is described to investigate the European geographical distribution
and a trend-analysis of the susceptibility of a common hospital-acquired pathogen S.
aureus against key indicator antibiotics. 
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In chapter 8 we aim to provide the larger framework of which EARSS is part. We present
the comprehensive Community strategy against antimicrobial resistance with its actions
to contain antimicrobial resistance and discuss how these actions are to be co-ordinated.
Finally, in chapter 9 we discuss general findings of the studies and provide
recommendations specifically for community- and hospital-acquired pathogens.
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